Distance-Placement-Incentive Policy for Rural Indonesian Teachers
- Candra Gani
- Jan 3
- 12 min read

Teachers play a pivotal role as the frontline force in a nation's educational system. Despite significant governmental budget allocations towards education, coupled with the construction of adequate facilities and comprehensive curriculum reforms, the true essence of educational quality remains intricately tied to the qualifications and competencies of educators. A teacher of high caliber serves as the linchpin in bolstering the efficacy of teaching and learning (Suryadarma et al., 2006), thereby exerting a positive influence on students' academic accomplishments (Darling-Hammond, 2000). In Indonesia, the uneven distribution of teachers, both in terms of quantity and quality, persists as a formidable challenge. This non-uniformity precipitates pronounced disparities in educational standards across diverse regions. Research conducted by Al-Samarrai (2007) illustrates that regions grappling with limited access to qualified instructors tend to exhibit inferior learning outcomes.
Therefore, this ministerial briefing is prepared to highlight the urgent need for new policies addressing educators in Indonesia's Frontier, Outermost, and Disadvantaged (3T) regions. As Hanushek & Woessmann (2015) suggest, improving educational standards correlates with economic growth and other development efforts. Thus, addressing the issue is crucial for the Ministry of Education as it profoundly affects regional development in the future.
Disparities in Teacher Quality and Distribution
Education is a legally guaranteed right for all Indonesians. Nonetheless, due to disparate development (World Bank, 2017) and market failure dynamics (Barr, 2012), there are significant inequalities in teacher quality and distribution throughout Indonesia. According to economic tendencies—akin to the adage 'where there's sugar, there are ants'—teachers gravitate towards urban assignments. Despite being civil servants with regionally tailored placements, these teachers often migrate to cities over time. This urban migration results in systemic inequalities and injustices within the national education system ((World Bank, 2017), with highly qualified teachers preferring urban comfort, thereby exacerbating the rural-urban divide and contributing to suboptimal student-teacher ratios (World Bank, 2020).
According to Kemendikbudristek (2022), around 68.4% of schools spanning from elementary to high school levels throughout Indonesia face deficits in teaching staff, predominantly clustered in urban regions. Detailed statistics are outlined in Table 1 provided below.

As Novianto (2020) asserts, the imbalance in teacher distribution has several repercussions including (1) diminished standards of classroom learning, (2) disparities in educational quality across Indonesian regions, and (3) inefficient utilization of teacher resources and Ministry of Education budgets. From the perspective of market failure (Plank & Davis, 2010), this phenomenon highlights three critical points: (1) the presence of information asymmetry in the educational content delivery process, (2) monopolization in human development activities, and (3) the necessity for the government to address long-term externalities to foster equality and enhance economic welfare.
Information asymmetry in educational content delivery is evident, as good-quality teachers predominantly instruct in urban areas (World Bank, 2020). Furthermore, in rural settings where one or two capable teachers exist, elevated student-teacher ratios dilute teacher attention (Kemendikbudristek, 2022). Consequently, urban students benefit from markedly enhanced pedagogical quality. Despite a uniform national curriculum, its delivery remains uneven between urban and rural students. Additionally, this disparity fosters an urban monopoly within the national education system. If unaddressed, peripheral communities will continue to fall behind urban areas, where children benefit from superior educational and human resource development initiatives. Conversely, rural children are compelled to settle for substandard education amid general resource scarcity. This market failure condition exacerbates education inequalities. Over time, as urban areas benefit from accelerated human resource development, rural regions will increasingly lag, setting the stage for cities to dominate rural areas in a zero-sum game scenario.
Also, the repercussions of teacher shortages in rural areas are amplifying progressively. Initially manifested as mere variances in classroom pedagogical quality, these shortages increasingly impair student literacy (World Bank, 2017), affecting their academic, skills, and emotional development. This degeneration compromises the quality of local human resources, precipitates economic crises in local sectors (Novianto, 2020), exacerbates social challenges, and hampers both regional and national development. Consider the economic divide between Jakarta and Papua in 2023: Jakarta's GDP per capita was approximately USD 21,166 PPP, while Papua's stood at just USD 5,121 PPP (BPS, 2024). This vast disparity—over 413%—underscores the profound economic divide between Indonesia's principal economic center and one of its least developed regions. Furthermore, a comparison of the Human Development Index (HDI) reveals significant disparities, with Jakarta's HDI at 0.861 compared to Papua's 0.6225 (BPS, 2024). Such stark economic and developmental discrepancies extend from provincial capitals to districts and villages. Without timely governmental intervention, these disparities are set to solidify, posing significant and systemic economic and non-economic challenges to equality in the future.
The 3T and TDI Innovation
In response to this divergence, the Indonesian government has initiated the 3T development area program (Frontier, Remote, and Underdeveloped), aimed at expediting infrastructure, education, and healthcare enhancements to elevate living standards in these regions. These areas include frontier regions, which border neighboring nations, remote areas with distant maritime zones and no direct land borders, and underdeveloped regions experiencing significant developmental delays. Based on data sourced from BAPPENAS (2014), approximately 20 districts are identified as remote, 23 as frontier, and 99 as underdeveloped. Consequently, the aggregate count of these 3T developments areas comprises 142 districts, representing 27.6% of the overall 514 districts across Indonesia (BAPPENAS, 2014).
Moreover, in 2017, the Ministry of Education also devised the Teacher Distribution Index (TDI) (Novianto, 2020). This metric serves as a tool for the Indonesian government to assess and ensure equitable teacher allocation across diverse regions, aiming to furnish each locality with an appropriate teaching workforce commensurate with its educational requisites. Factoring in variables such as pupil-teacher ratios, educator credentials, and specific exigencies stemming from geographical and demographic parameters, this index endeavors to optimize teacher deployment and educational assets, thereby facilitating equal access to high-quality schooling for all Indonesian students. As illustrated in Table 2, based on information from Kemendikbud (2016), it is evident that the majority of 3T areas, totaling 89.4%, have a teacher-to-school ratio lower than the national average. Moreover, in terms of teaching competence, 55.6% of these regions fall below the national proficiency standard, with 13.4% being served by teachers lacking sufficient qualifications. The existing condition of educators in these areas is concerning, both in terms of quantity and quality.

The government's innovative approach to mapping the 3T development program and devising the TDI has exerted a considerable impact on the identification process of teacher distribution challenges in Indonesia. Presently, the next step involves assessing the efficacy of current policies. Should they fall short, governmental action is required to rectify deficiencies in accordance with the principles of economic welfare (Barr, 2012), given the national education system in Indonesia's classification as a public good (Daviet, 2016).
The Efficacy of Present Government Policies
In general, all education regulations and policies in Indonesia are based on Article 31 of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD) 1945. This article asserts the right of every citizen to education, with the government tasked to ensure and manage the national education system through laws (UU). This constitutional provision forms the cornerstone ensuring equitable educational access, aligning with the concept of public good as outlined by Daviet (2016) in a post-World War II UNESCO working paper. Subsequently, the government enacts various derivative laws to regulate implementation processes. Initially, via Law Number 20 of 2003, the government established the fundamental framework of the Indonesian education system to attain educational equality nationwide. This was subsequently reinforced by Law Number 25 of 2009, which delineated principles for ensuring equitable and high-quality educational services. Subsequently, pertaining to educational management at the local level, the government promulgated two laws: the erstwhile Law Number 22 of 1999 concerning the jurisdiction of regional authorities in educational administration at the grassroots level, encompassing issues of equity, and Law Number 32 of 2004 addressing the equitable allocation of educational resources, notably teachers. Regarding policies concerning educators themselves, they are governed by two statutes: Law Number 14 of 2005, which pertains to teacher education, professional development, employment conditions, remuneration, and welfare, alongside the pivotal role of teachers in enhancing educational quality. These are supplemented by Government Regulations, subordinate to legislative enactments, such as Ministerial Regulation Number 19 of 2017, which stipulates the minimal qualifications for educators; Bachelor's degree and a professional teaching certificate.
Unfortunately, the seven regulations above appear ineffective in governing the distribution and quality of teachers (Novianto, 2020), necessitating further analysis and the formulation of more appropriate policies. Firstly, based on Law Number 22 of 1999 and Law Number 32 of 2004, the primary responsibility for equalizing educational quality is delegated to local governments, which have limited territorial jurisdiction and weak fiscal capabilities. While the central government still provides education transfer funds, these allocations are predominantly absorbed by civil servant teacher salaries and infrastructure development, thus insufficient for addressing teacher shortages. Consequently, local governments are compelled to employ contract teachers at lower wages (World Bank, 2017). This situation is exacerbated by the limited number of civil servants recruited by the central government and the tendency for transfers to urban areas, leaving the burden of teacher shortages to be managed by local governments (Kemendikbud, 2016). Moreover, the unequal fiscal strength of each region further complicates the equitable distribution of educational quality (BAPPENAS, 2014). For example, despite West Papua Province having greater fiscal capacity compared to Papua Province, the challenges of teacher distribution in Papua are more significant. This situation leads to new disparities because development is not managed from a national perspective. A "helicopter view" approach from the central government should penetrate regional boundaries to promote fairer and more efficient equality solutions. With this perspective, the government can distribute teacher equalization funds from the center according to needs. Thus, areas requiring more resources can be allocated larger allocations, while areas with fewer needs can have their allocations reduced to subsidize other areas in greater need (Daviet, 2016), creating a more effective and balanced distribution (Barr, 2012). Through this approach, the central government can create national Pareto efficiency in efforts to address educational inequality (Metcalfe, 2000) and provide externalities for maximal future nation-building development (Plank & Davis, 2010).
Secondly, Law Number 14 of 2005 and Government Regulation Number 19 of 2017 do regulate the recruitment process, qualifications, and numeration for civil servant teachers (Novianto, 2020). However, these policies overlook the psychological and sociological conditions of teachers placed in 3T areas (Kemendikbud, 2016). Unlike contract teachers recruited by local governments without lifelong job security, civil servant teachers are recruited by the central government with lifelong job security and pension guarantees, thus imposing a significant budgetary burden on the central government. However, due to the government's oversight in understanding the psychological and sociological conditions of teachers, the government provides relatively similar salaries to those placed in urban or developing areas as those placed in 3T areas (World Bank, 2020). As a result, many teachers in 3T regions join as civil servant teachers primarily for salary and pension benefits. While initially open to placement anywhere, most eventually seek transfers to more developed areas. Aside from causing a shortage of teachers in some areas, this also leads to budgetary inefficiencies in the central government. The government continues to allocate the same budget for their salaries, but these teachers accumulate in places where they are less needed (Novianto, 2020). The government overlooks the fact that psychologically and sociologically, these teachers are also individuals who desire comfortable and comprehensive living conditions in urban or developed areas. If with the same salary they can have a better quality of life, then they have no reason to stay in remote areas. Although the government offers transportation allowances for teachers in 3T areas (Kemendikbudristek, 2022), the amount only covers commuting costs, offering little incentive for them to stay.
Subsequently, in 2019, the government also issued the PPPK (contract-based government teachers) policy to address this issue. This policy aimed to convert contract teachers previously employed by local governments into permanent contract of the central government. However, according to (Artisa, 2017), this policy has two weaknesses: (1) elevating contract teachers from local areas to central government employees only alters their employment status (Setkab, 2020) without enhancing their quality, as the quality of contract teachers has been mediocre from the outset (Hayat, 2013), considering that intelligent young individuals would not opt to become contract teachers in remote areas, and (2) the PPPK policy requires the government to reallocate funds to appoint new civil servant teachers (Cabinet Secretariat, 2020), thereby preventing the government from recruiting high-quality civil servant teachers and using its budget to reward long-serving contract teachers from local areas who possess mediocre qualifications. Additionally, the government also has the PPG (Teacher Professional Education) program specifically for 3T areas (LLDIKTI, 2018), where teachers willing to be placed in 3T areas will be funded to pursue professional education free of charge. Nevertheless, with similar salary numerations, the allure of working in more developed urban areas remains stronger, causing intelligent and potential young individuals to opt for employment elsewhere rather than becoming teachers in remote areas (Novianto, 2020). This situation directly impacts teacher quality, as although it slightly assists in the equalization process, these policies still fail to effectively filter the best talents to become teachers capable of improving education quality in remote areas. Furthermore, the quotas for both the PPPK and PPG 3T policies are limited and do not match the demand, thus continuing to impose a high burden on local government equalization efforts (World Bank, 2020). Importantly, the remuneration acquired by educators through these initiatives matches the standard pay of civil servants, which does not assure that teachers will refrain from relocating to more advanced regions, as has been previously observed.
Distance-Placement-Incentive Policy for Rural Teachers
Aside from being educators, teachers are inherently economic beings attracted to other value-added aspects of their lives. The government cannot expect every teacher to possess angelic qualities and compel them to believe that teaching is a heroic activity full of dedication to the nation (Purwoko, 2013). Teachers seem to be prohibited from asking about material benefits. On the contrary, the government should be fair in addressing the welfare of teachers and their families (Simanungkalit, 2013), and consider additional benefits for those willing to be placed in 3T areas. This has been demonstrated by a private foundation named Dompet Dhuafa, which successfully dispatched teachers to remote areas with high salaries since 2015 (Rivalina, 2016). This is a critical juncture for the Ministry of Education to introduce supplementary policies and Ministerial Regulations augmenting prior regulations, particularly focusing on the Distance-Placement-Incentive Policy for Rural Indonesian Teachers. These regulations should, at minimum, address two key facets: (1) determining the conditionalities for offering distance-plecement-incentive to educators in 3T areas and (2) allocating budgetary resources from the central government to support this policy.
In terms of the Distance-Placement-Incentive mechanism, it is imperative for the government to establish fundamental criteria, including (1) eligibility limited to public school teachers at the elementary, middle, and high school levels stationed in 3T regions, and (2) a willingness to undergo additional professional training specifically addressing pedagogical strategies for learners in underserved locales (World Bank, 2017). These requisites carry significant weight. Firstly, by offering a salary twice that of civil servant educators in Indonesia (World Bank, 2020), the government endeavors to provide substantial added value for these teachers. This augmentation in remuneration serves as a novel incentive, potentially enticing youthful aspirants to embrace teaching careers and deterring transfers among existing educators. Secondly, the pedagogical aspect is of paramount importance. Despite ongoing efforts to develop equitable educational infrastructure nationwide (BAPPENAS, 2014), schools in remote areas still lack essential resources such as teaching materials, labs, and libraries. Therefore, teachers in these regions must possess specialized pedagogical skills to deliver quality education despite resource limitations.
Furthermore, the specific budget burden for the 3T teacher incentive policy should ideally be shifted back to the central government for several reasons. Firstly, the central government possesses a reserve fund known as the Permanent Fund for Education (LPDP), currently utilized for scholarships for graduate studies abroad (LPDP, 2024), which could be redirected towards investing in primary education policies. According to Barr (2012), tertiary education is less pressing for government subsidy and could be financed through private funding models or borne directly by students due to its high individual return, while primary education is a fundamental need that should ideally be considered a public good. Consequently, children should not have to wait longer to access quality teachers simply due to regional budget constraints (LLDIKTI, 2018). Secondly, this policy would be more effective and strategic when viewed from a central perspective, as the central government can calculate Pareto efficiency and the externalities impact of its policies at a national level (Plank & Davis, 2010), rather than being confined to provincial and district boundaries. Thirdly, the central government should not hesitate as it has prior experience investing in the compulsory 12-year education program and the construction of schools nationwide. The government has precise calculations demonstrating how its previous investments in primary education significantly influenced productivity growth and national economic growth during 1973 - 1997era (World Bank, 2020). Fourthly, the government needs to salvage fiscal wastage (Novianto, 2020). Addressing the teacher equalization issue is essential as it plays a pivotal role in the broader education landscape. Swift action is necessary to prevent fiscal inefficiencies in other budget areas. Challenges faced by teachers can undermine the effectiveness of various policies, such as infrastructure development and conditional cash transfer to ensure school attendance. Hence, central government intervention is vital for efficiently coordinating these interconnected policies.
Conclusion
Investing in the quality and distribution of teachers within Indonesia's 3T regions is akin to bolstering the economic supply chain through human capital investments, echoing Keynes' insights (1936). The developmental trajectory of Indonesia's 3T regions hinges on the proficiency of its human resources. Thus, for developmental efficacy, it behooves the government to swiftly craft new policies, specifically targeting the Distance-Placement-Incentive Policy for Rural Indonesian Teachers. These educators stand as the primary architects of cultivating adept minds and serving as effective agents of regional progress. By adopting such proactive measures, the development of 3T regions can be expedited, thereby optimizing developmental investments when juxtaposed with the current reliance on local authorities. While the central government may initially mitigate substantial financial burdens by devolving teacher equalization duties to local jurisdictions, a holistic examination reveals significant material and temporal losses resulting from this approach's developmental externalities. This novel policy warrants consideration. It is also temporary in nature; with the advent of quality education, regions will rapidly progress and transcend the 3T conditions. Subsequently, the government will find no necessity to prolong this policy, as a state of perfect market competition will have ensued.


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